THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

Author: Kristína Šefčíková, Prague Security Studies Institute
With contributions from: Lobbio, z.s.

November 2024

Prague Security Studies Institute

CONTENTS

The project partner is Lobbio.
The project was financially supported by the Open Information Partnership.

INTRODUCTION

The Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) has joined forces with advocacy experts from the organization *Lobbio* to initiate a discussion on how the Czech public service media should fulfill their potentially new and sensitive role related to the proposed amendment of the new § 2 par. 2 in the amendment to the law on Czech Television (and similarly on Czech Radio)[1]. According to this amendment, Czech public service media are to be officially tasked with combating disinformation. This topic is important to address even if the proposed obligation is ultimately not enshrined in law or if it is instead incorporated under the broader goal of "contributing to media literacy" as suggested in an amended proposal. Should this new obligation not be included in the law, discussions should continue on the limitations of such a task, particularly regarding the scope of responsibility, oversight mechanisms, isolation from political influence, and the protection of free speech.

This publication offers practical recommendations for Czech public service media, drawing on the experiences of public service media in other European countries and their approaches to addressing disinformation. The findings are also informed by interviews with experts from these countries. The recommendations reflect the complexity of the issue and cover several levels of countering disinformation, including aspects of strategy, content, and formats, but also the aspect of cooperation with diverse actors.

METHODOLOGY

This publication works with a definition of disinformation[2] as the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information intended to deceive or mislead recipients. The purpose of such actions is either to cause harm or to gain political, personal, or financial advantage.

Given the focus of this analysis on the experience of foreign public service media in countering disinformation, we examined a sample of eight European countries: **Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Belgium, and France**. The sample was selected to ensure the highest possible representation of different regions of Europe, reflecting diverse political and social contexts and how these have influenced the development of local public service media approaches to disinformation.

The key research questions included:

— What is the strategy of public service media across Europe for countering disinformation, and what activities do they undertake in this area?

— Which counter-disinformation measures have proven effective, and which have not worked?

— Does national media legislation and/or internal regulations of public service media address the concept of disinformation? If not, what conceptual framework do they use?

---

1   Draft Act Amending Act No. 483/1991 Coll., on Czech Television, as amended, Act No. 484/1991 Coll., on Czech Radio, as amended, and other related acts. https://odok.cz/portal/veklep/material/KORNCVDDHD4D/

2   RESIST Counter Disinformation Toolkit. UK Government Communication Service, 2021. Translation of the handbook and adaptation to the Czech environment was provided by the Czech Ministry of Interior, Center Against Hybrid Threats.. https://www.mvcr.cz/chh/clanek/ke-stazeni-resist-prirucka-pro-boj-s-dezinformacemi.aspx

The analysis is based on data such as the *World Press Freedom Index* (2024)[3], the *Media Literacy Index* (2023)[4], and national surveys on public trust in public service media. Additionally, a review of the media legislation frameworks, internal rules, and codes of conduct in the eight studied countries was conducted.

A key source of data consisted of 11 semi-structured interviews with experts. Initial interviews were conducted with Czech respondents to map the current state of Czech public service media. Subsequently, eight interviews were held with representatives from the sample countries, and the international perspective was addressed in an interview with a representative of the European Broadcasting Union. Respondents included current or former employees of public service media, experts closely cooperating with public service media, or alternatively media experts from academia. The questions posed and the list of organizations represented by the respondents are provided in Appendices 2 and 3 at the end of the document.

EXPERIENCE FROM ABROAD

In all the countries monitored by PSSI, public service media address disinformation and manipulative content through fact-checking activities. These activities are typically part of broader programs aimed at enhancing media literacy and promoting critical thinking. Neither legislation nor the internal editorial codes of media explicitly mention disinformation, instead focusing on developing skills to identify false information. Media activities are often targeted at specific age groups, but limited in most cases to seniors and the youth. However, these efforts tend to be sporadic, lack systematic implementation, and their actual impact is not recorded or measured. Despite the absence of a legal obligation to combat disinformation, all public service media from the studied sample actively engage in addressing this issue and plan to continue, with most intending to expand such activities.

A comparative overview of the studied countries in terms of press freedom, media literacy levels, trust in public service media, and legislative frameworks is available in Appendix 1 at the end of the document.

Czech Republic

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	67 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	17.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	15.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

The following section explores each country in the studied sample, addressing their specific characteristics beyond the overarching trends described above.

---

3 World Press Freedom Index. Reporters Without Borders, 2024. https://rsf.org/en/index
4 Media Literacy Index. Open Society Institute Sofia, 2023. https://osis.bg/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/MLI-report-in-English-22.06.pdf

Prague Security
Studies Institute

Finland

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	84 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	5.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	1.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

In Finland, public service media play a significant role in countering disinformation and enhancing media literacy. For many years, the Finnish government allowed individual institutions to determine their approach to tackling disinformation. However, in recent years, it has leaned towards assigning greater responsibility in this area to public service media. This shift is primarily due to the high level of trust that Finland's public service media enjoy among the population, in contrast to government institutions. The Finnish public service broadcaster *Yle* has developed educational programs addressing disinformation and teaching citizens critical thinking skills through accessible formats such as articles, podcasts, and documentary series focused on digital safety and recognizing fake news.

For younger generations, *Yle* has created new platforms on social media, including TikTok, where short videos promote digital literacy principles. Another initiative, *Yle Newsclass*, allows students to gain practical insights into journalism and engage in fact-checking exercises. Interactive educational programs, such as the "Media World" in partnership with a Finnish theme park, offer children a fun way to learn the basics of media literacy. Through these activities, *Yle* not only strengthens public resilience to disinformation but also fosters a media-literate generation capable of navigating today's digital landscape.

France

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	82 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	21.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	17.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

Within the studied sample, France does not significantly differ in terms of the main strategies used to counter disinformation but offers inspiring examples of how these strategies are implemented. French public service media place a strong emphasis on fact-checking. Segments on disinformation have become a regular feature of morning and evening news broadcasts, gradually receiving more airtime to ensure that audiences are consistently reminded of the importance of this issue. A unique aspect of France's approach is its focus on explaining journalistic practices, including how information is verified and disinformation uncovered. A particularly popular program, *"True or False"* (*Vrai ou Faux*)[5] by the radio and TV station *Franceinfo*, has gained a reputation thanks to its host who has become the face of the program. Known for his informal and approachable style, the host engages directly with audiences in the field and fosters open discussions with individuals holding diverse viewpoints. The appeal of this approach is reflected in the program's growing viewership, suggesting that infotainment

---

5   "Vrai ou Faux", the show on Franceinfo. Franceinfo, 2024. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/replay-magazine/franceinfo/vrai-ou-fake-l-emission/

formats can effectively broaden the audience for fact-checking initiatives, including reaching more skeptical segments of the population.

Latvia

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	80 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	12.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	18.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

Latvian public service media operate in an environment where there is a societal consensus on the importance of information resilience. Therefore, they focus on disinformation despite the absence of an official legal obligation to do so. Their programmatic activities concentrate on explaining how disinformation is created and operates, and on clarifying its role in information warfare. A major topic is also demystifying the work of journalists. In addition, there is a strategic emphasis on increasing media literacy and critical thinking among young people, a task addressed by Latvian legislation, using engaging formats such as comics, entertaining quiz programs, and the involvement of influencers, alongside a dedicated online portal.[6] Public service media also raise their visibility through collaborations, such as with non-governmental organizations, and by participating in public events ranging from Christmas markets to dedicated events like the Festival of Democracy.

These strategies contribute to Latvia's high levels of trust in public service media within the studied sample. However, these media still face challenges, such as how to measure their impact on broader society, ensure representation of all social groups, and address the sense of exclusion felt by certain segments of the population, which is linked to lower trust in the media. Additionally, they face challenges in reaching younger audiences, which prompted them to increase their activity on social media.

Belgium (Flemish Community)

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	79 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	16.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	10.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

In this analysis, we specifically focused on VRT, the public service broadcaster of the Flemish Community. VRT's approach is characterized by a high degree of collaboration and combined funding for counter-disinformation activities from various academic and international projects, which has allowed them to increase the capacity of their teams dedicated to fact-checking and investigative work in the field of disinformation.

---

6 Medijpratība. Latvijas sabiedriskie mediji, 2024. https://www.lsm.lv/zinas/medijpratiba/

Their collaboration network includes various actors, such as academic institutions, the tech industry, private media, independent non-governmental organizations, and international platforms like the European Broadcasting Union, EDMO, and international fact-checking networks. This network forms part of an effort to enhance the trust and credibility of VRT. The goal is to demonstrate that public service media do not create content on their own, and the involvement of diverse actors ensures objectivity and independence.

VRT also works closely with an innovation team focused on artificial intelligence (AI), which helps transform content into different formats, allowing them to reach a broader range of target audiences. For example, AI can transform a traditional article into a script for a video on TikTok.

Estonia

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	73 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	6.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	4.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

Estonian public service media maintain high levels of trust. Neither media legislation nor the media internal rules specifically address disinformation, with the focus being on providing diverse and high-quality content that is accessible to all. As a result, the activities of Estonian public service media focus on a rich cultural program, opening debates on current issues with a variety of viewpoints, and local community-based programs. However, they still pay attention to disinformation, particularly through educational activities aimed at fostering critical thinking, building resilience against disinformation, and explaining how the media works. A significant role in implementing these activities is played by collaborations and exchanges of expertise with non-governmental organizations and international platforms such as EDMO and the European Broadcasting Union. In practice, these approaches aim to build such trust and a close relationship with the audience that direct addressing of disinformation is needed on a minimal level.

Estonian public service media continue to face challenges such as the attention economy and competition for viewership with media outlets that use sensationalist language. Measuring the impact of their counter-disinformation activities remains an area to be improved, and there is ongoing discussion about how to effectively divert people's attention from disinformation. Additionally, Estonian public service media still struggle to reach young audiences, although this has been partially improved by increased activity on social media.

United Kingdom

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	62 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	23.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	13.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

The BBC, as the UK's public service broadcaster, focuses on countering disinformation primarily through fact-checking initiatives, such as BBC Verify (formerly BBC Reality Check), which uncovers disinformation and manipulative content circulating on social media. Additionally, the BBC runs educational programs like BBC Young Reporter, helping young people develop skills for critically assessing online content and identifying disinformation. These initiatives are aimed at a broad public audience.

Public trust in the BBC has declined in recent years. Less than half of Brits (45%)[7] who regularly follow the news say they turn to the BBC for news they trust. However, the BBC's efforts face significant challenges, especially concerning the rapid spread of disinformation on social media, which makes real-time fact-checking nearly impossible. Another issue is reaching all demographic groups, particularly older generations who may not be as equipped to detect disinformation online.

The UK government regularly provides funding to support the BBC's efforts in countering disinformation. This funding primarily supports initiatives addressing manipulative content, especially in regions affected by state-backed propaganda by actors like Russia. In 2024, this funding continued, ensuring that the BBC can expand its digital platforms and strengthen investigative journalism, particularly in conflict-affected areas such as Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan.

Ukraine

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	49 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	61.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	30.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

In the past two years, Ukraine has faced significant challenges in countering disinformation, primarily due to the ongoing Russian war. Given the difficult geopolitical situation and the intense foreign influence, Ukraine's public broadcaster (UA) plays a crucial role in providing reliable information. UA produces educational programs focused on disinformation, including segments that uncover manipulated news and propaganda. In addition, Ukrainian journalists collaborate with independent fact-checking organizations like StopFake to verify information and ensure transparency.

However, UA faces several challenges, particularly when it comes to reaching younger audiences, who mainly consume news via social media. In response, UA is developing digital content tailored for platforms like YouTube or Instagram, and is considering expanding into TikTok. Another challenge is limited financial resources, which hinder greater investments in advanced tools for countering disinformation.

---

7   Trust in Public Service Media. Media Intelligence Service, European Broadcasting Union, 2024. https://www.ebu.ch/research/membersonly/report/trust-in-public-service-media.

Poland

Trust in Public Service Media (2024)	29 %
World Press Freedom Index (2024)	47.
European Media Literacy Index (2023)	22.
Legal Obligation to Combat Disinformation	No

In 2016–2017, the Polish government took the first steps to regulate the media in relation to countering disinformation. Changes were made in some provisions of the media law and discussions began about the need to protect the information space from foreign influences. In 2021–2022, there was a change in the Broadcasting and Television Act, which, although controversial, was an attempt to regulate foreign influence in the Polish media environment.[8]

Poland is an example of a country where public service media were exposed to political influence, specifically in connection with the work of fact-checking departments under the former government. The Polish experience has shown that in a polarized environment, the effective way to counter disinformation is in apolitical ways, for example by addressing scientific disinformation with the help of well-known scientific personalities and by supporting digital hygiene. In addition, they focus on educating vulnerable groups about navigating the online space. In 2022–2023, Polish public media along with private media participated in a project that focused on disinformation in the field of telecommunications (including those related to 5G networks). This project involved a variety of formats, including physics lesson manuals, articles on topics of science and physics,, brochures, leaflets and articles in the local press. The case of Poland is also interesting because of cooperation with a government organization, specifically the national research institute NASK (Naukowa i Akademická Sieć Komputerowa) under the Polish Ministry of Digitization, which provides data, research and monitoring of the online space in the field of disinformation.

---

8   Maksym Sijer, Wojciech Pokora. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats and Answers in Poland. Info Ops Poland, 2024. https://infoops.pl/foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-and-answers-in-poland/.

CONCLUSIONS

The media legislation and internal rules of the studied sample of European countries typically do not impose an obligation on public service media to engage in countering disinformation, but rather emphasize the tasks of increasing media literacy and critical thinking. In practice, however, all public service media in the studied sample address the issue of disinformation, and there is consensus that they should be doing so. They plan to continue these activities and often expand them.

The approach of public service media to countering disinformation is fundamentally linked to the issue of trust in public service media. Increasing trust should be one of the strategic priorities of this approach. If trust in public service media is low, their efforts to counter disinformation may lose their purpose. Without sufficient trust in public service media, people are more likely to turn to alternative sources of information, including those that spread disinformation, and public service media will have limited influence on public opinion.

This approach can be supported by specific measures that not only increase the credibility of public service media but also strengthen society's resilience to manipulative content. Public service media in countries with high trust in public service media and simultaneously high resilience to disinformation focus on the preventive building of informational resilience by explaining how disinformation works, bringing journalism closer to the public, increasing media literacy and critical thinking, and fostering open debates on key topics with representation of various views.

A common weakness in the studied sample is the excessive focus on fact-checking as the only systematic activity to support informational resilience, while preventive activities with potentially greater impact remain fragmented. It is also important to note that for an effective approach to countering disinformation, the growing demands on public service media must be reflected in their funding. In addition to increased demands on journalistic work, this also requires more substantial coordination (management) activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic Level
— Effective countering of disinformation requires a strategic approach, including the setting of key goals, prioritization, and determination of short- and medium-term steps to achieve them. **Building trust in public service media should be the main long-term goal.**

— Public service media can play a significant role in the area of media literacy. There is already a sufficient amount of relevant educational materials being created, for example, in the non-profit sector. Public service media can help navigate the large volume of this material and increase its reach.

— A strategic approach to countering disinformation should include a stronger regional aspect, with more local studios engaging in the communication of local issues related to informational resilience on a regular basis.

— Part of building this strategy should involve a thorough understanding of the audience and its segmentation into specific target groups, to which the formats and content of disinformation-related

activities will be adapted. A traditional but incomplete approach abroad is to differentiate only two specific target groups — young people and seniors. There is a need to pay increased attention to the large portion of the population between these traditional groups, moving away from treating the target audience as a broad general public.

— Audience segmentation is closely related to the need to measure and evaluate the impact of activities against disinformation on specific target groups. To ensure the effectiveness of these activities, it is essential to understand their reach and assess what works and what does not. Knowledge exchange in this area can also occur at the international level, such as within the European Broadcasting Union.

Content Level

— It is important to signal the significance of the issues of informational resilience and disinformation by dedicating regular programs to them. The Czech Radio's Ověřovna program systematically fulfills this task, and we recommend instituting a similar regular program within Czech Television.

— Due to the sensitivity of the concept of disinformation, when addressing this issue, we recommend focusing on explaining manipulation tactics, the motivations behind the creation and spread of disinformation, and the role it plays in information warfare, rather than focusing on highlighting specific disinformation content. This represents a more neutral approach with an emphasis on prevention and building resilience of the population, so that they develop the ability to independently identify disinformation.

— International experience highlights the importance of familiarizing the public with journalistic and fact-checking work, either through media outputs or group education formats. Familiarizing the audience with the journalistic process has a higher likelihood of increasing trust in the information provided by public service media, according to our respondents' views.

— Trust can also be increased while indirectly addressing informational resilience through apolitical topics, such as informing the public about digital well-being principles and cybersecurity.

Format Level

— Just as detailed audience segmentation is important, it is also crucial to adapt the formats in which the content is presented to these segments. To increase the impact of public service media activities on a broader part of the population, a wide range of formats is needed, from traditional articles, television and radio broadcasts, to audiovisual content on social media and interactive educational formats (quizzes, games, comics).

— To help reduce the time and financial costs of such a variety of formats, testing an innovative approach from Flanders, Belgium, could be beneficial, where artificial intelligence helps transform content into various formats for different platforms.

— Public service media abroad often struggle with reaching young people because they focus their counter-disinformation related content on their websites. It has been confirmed that for

this target group, activity on social media (especially in video format) is crucial, but it needs to be regular and long-term.

— International experience shows partial success with involving influencers and using informal communication methods with the audience, which appears more accessible. An alternative could be assigning a visible "talking head" from among the staff to the topic of informational resilience.

— In countries with higher trust in public service media, there is a greater emphasis on direct contact with the audience, mainly in the form of presence at various cultural, regional, and public events (in the form of dedicated booths, stages, and programs).

Collaboration Level

— Countries with higher levels of trust in public service media are characterized by a greater degree of collaboration with other entities. Engaging various stakeholders can help increase the perceived credibility of public service media and support the expansion of the reach of their content and activities.

— Collaboration can take place both in the area of obtaining data about the audience and the impact of public service media activities on them at the international level, in cooperation with the European Broadcasting Union (and its Media News Service, a market research unit), or with European Digital Media Observatories (EDMO, specifically CEDMO in the context of the Czech Republic).

— On a local level, non-profit organizations can be a good source of data, and they are also suitable partners for educational activities and working with specific vulnerable groups due to their organizational and managerial capacities.

— A positive experience abroad also includes increasing collaboration with schools and universities in activities aimed at raising awareness about journalistic work, which has a higher probability of building trust in the media.

PSSI Perspectives available for download at www.pssi.cz
Inquiries at pssi@pssi.cz
page 12

APPENDIX 1: OVERVIEW OF THE SAMPLE COUNTRIES REGARDING PRESS FREEDOM, MEDIA LITERACY, TRUST IN PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA, AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

Table 1: Trust in Public Service Media (2024)[9]

Country	Trust percentage
Finland	84%
France	82%
Latvia	80%
Belgium	79% Flemish Community 65% French Community
Estonia	73 %
Czech Republic	67 %
United Kingdom	62 %
Poland	29 %

Note: Data for Ukraine is only available for 2023 (49%).[10]

Table 3: European Media Literacy Index (2023)[12]

Country	Global rank
Finland	1.
Estonia	4.
Belgium	10.
United Kingdom	13.
Czech Republic	15.
France	17.
Latvia	18.
Poland	22.
Ukraine	30.

Table 2: World Press Freedom Index (2024)[11]

Country	Global rank
Finland	5.
Estonia	6.
Latvia	12.
Belgium	16.
Czech Republic	17.
France	21.
United Kingdom	23.
Poland	47.
Ukraine	61.

9   Based on national surveys, methodology may vary, see sources:
    Finland, France, Estonia, Czech Republic: Trust in Public Service Media. Media Intelligence Service, European Broadcasting Union, 2024. https://www.ebu.ch/research/membersonly/report/trust-in-public-service-media.
    Belgium, UK, Poland: Digital News Report 2024. Reuters Institute for Journalism, 2024. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2024
    Ukraine:
    Latvia: Trust in the media and influencing factors. Latvijas Fakti, Council of Public Electronic Media (SEPLP), 2024. https://www.seplp.lv/lv/media/2316/download?attachment
10 Ukrainian media use and trust in 2023. Internews, 2023. https://internews.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/USAID-Internews-Media-Survey-2023-EN.pdf
11 World Press Freedom Index. Reporters Without Borders, 2024. https://rsf.org/en/index
12 Media Literacy Index. Open Society Institute Sofia, 2023. https://osis.bg/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/MLI-report-in-English-22.06.pdf

**Prague Security
Studies Institute**

Table 4: Legal Obligation of Public Service Media to Combat Disinformation in Selected Countries[13]

Country	Obligation to Counter Disinformation	Related Obligations (alternatively who enforces them)	Note/Source
Poland	No	The Broadcasting Council is tasked with promoting media literacy and cooperating with other government bodies, NGOs, etc., on media education.	Broadcasting Act Article 6
Finland	No	Audiovisual service providers can create media education codes. Otherwise, media education is provided by the Finnish Centre for Media Education and Audiovisual Programmes.	Act on the Finnish Centre for Media Education and Audiovisual Programmes, Act on Audiovisual Programmes Section 8
United Kingdom	No	OFCOM, as the national regulator, has a legal obligation to build media literacy through action plans, etc.	Media Act 2024, Online Safety Act (addressing disinformation on online networks, not public service media)
Latvia	No	The National Electronic Mass Media Council also promotes media literacy.	Act on the Press and Other Mass Media, Electronic Mass Media Law Section 60
Ukraine	No	Media literacy is supported through the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy's project, Filter.	**Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting**
Belgium	No	To protect minors from harmful content, providers must take measures to enhance media literacy and awareness.	Law relating to audiovisual media services Art. 29 (applies only to bilingual Brussels region)
France	No	A duty to counter disinformation arises only in the case of information related to electoral campaigns. ARCOM contributes to countering disinformation during elections. National TV must promote the development and dissemination of media literacy.	Law relating to the fight against the manipulation of information, Law relating to freedom of communication Article 43-11
Estonia	No	Public service broadcasters focus on media literacy promotion and resilience.	Estonian Public Broadcasting Act, Media Services Act

---

13   Broadcasting Act Article 6. The National Broadcasting Council. https://www.gov.pl/web/krrit-en/polish-media-law-1
Act on the Finnish Centre for Media Education and Audiovisual Programmes. Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland, 2011. https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2011/en20110711.pdf. Section 8. https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2011/en20110710.pdf
Online Media Literacy Strategy. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, 2021, s. 8. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60f6a632d3bf7f56867df4e1/DCMS_Media_Literacy_Report_Roll_Out_Accessible_PDF.pdf
Media literacy. OFCOM. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-use-and-attitudes/media-literacy/
Media Act 2024, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/15/data.pdf
Online Safety Act 2023, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50/enacted
On the Press and Other Mass Media, https://www.inlatplus.lv/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/3521_On_the_Press_and_Other_Mass_Media.doc-1.pdf
Electronic Mass Media Law, 2010. https://wipolex-res.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/lv/lv075en.html
Filter. National media literacy project. Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine. https://filter.mkip.gov.ua/en/4329-2/
Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting, 2021. https://cedem.org.ua/en/library/law-on-television-radio/
Law Relating to Audiovisual Media Services, Art 29. https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2017050503&table_name=loi
LAW No. 2018-1202 of 22 December 2018 on combating information manipulation, 2018. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000037847559/.
Law No. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986 on freedom of communication (Léotard Law), Article 43-11. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000512205/2024-11-06/
Estonian Public Broadcasting Act, 2022. https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/compare_original?id=528022022001
Media Services Act, 2019. https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/511012019003/consolide

APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONS ASKED IN SEMI-STRUCTURED EXPERT INTERVIEWS

1. What is the current counter-disinformation strategy of public service media in your country?
2. What formats, programs, projects, or activities are involved?
3. Who are your target audiences? Do you have direct contact with your audiences?
4. Do these activities have a regional aspect?
5. Do you collaborate on counter-disinformation efforts with other entities or sectors (e.g., NGOs, educational organizations, European Broadcasting Union)?
6. How do you assess the impact of your activities in this area? What works, and what does not? What needs improvement?
7. What are the future plans of your country's public service media regarding countering disinformation?
8. Are there any specific laws or regulations that require public service media to actively counter disinformation? If so, how do these laws shape the work of public service media?
9. Are there any government agencies with which cooperation is possible on this topic? Is there any ongoing cooperation with government bodies?

APPENDIX 3: ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED IN EXPERT INTERVIEWS

1. Czech Radio
2. BBC
3. VRT (Public Service Broadcaster of the Flemish Community of Belgium)
4. European Broadcasting Union
5. Baltic Centre for Media Excellence
6. European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO)
7. Center for Countering Disinformation (Ukrainian government working body)
8. Tallinn University
9. Reporters Without Borders
10. International Republican Institute
11. Former employee of the Czech Government Office